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Executive summary
	 The	Resettlement	Framework,	currently	in	the	final	
stages of negotiations, holds the potential to shape 
how the European Union (EU) will welcome asylum 
seekers in future. With this new piece of legislation, 
the European Union attempts to approach resettlement 
in a systematic, structural and sustainable way. If 
administered boldly, it is an opportunity for the EU to 
offer a safe way for individuals in need of international 
protection to access asylum in the member states. 
	 During	the	negotiations	on	the	file,	tensions	emerged	
between	two	different	and	conflicting	approaches	as	to	
the primary aim and conceptualisation of this policy 
instrument: as a humanitarian pathway for the most 
vulnerable or as a migration management tool as part 
of an increasingly control-oriented Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS). While the Parliament strongly 
opposed the latter, the Council sees a great potential in 
the Resettlement Framework to control the numbers and 
profiles	of	individuals	being	granted	protection	under	
this legislation. 
 However, turning the Resettlement Framework into 
an instrument of migration management is interlinked 
with several problematic issues:
q  First, member states have displayed a lack of 
ambition and realism in pushing for  
non-binding resettlement commitments as  
well as no compulsory quantitative targets to be 
included in the Resettlement Framework. Given 
the	significant	and	growing	resettlement	needs	
worldwide, it raises the question to what extent 
member states are motivated to establish the 
Resettlement Framework as a viable alternative to 
dangerous crossings via the Mediterranean. 
q  Second, the legislation contains provisions that could 
potentially be used in a discriminatory fashion to 
exclude some vulnerable individuals from accessing 
asylum through resettlement. Among these are 
specific	eligibility	and	ineligibility	criteria	as	well	as	
procedural aspects and the inclusion of humanitarian 
admission programmes. 
q  Third, other elements of the Resettlement 
Framework go even further to form the basis for 
discouraging	spontaneous	arrivals	in	the	first	place	
and deterring individuals from seeking protection 
through resettlement altogether. These include 
again ineligibility criteria, but also the link to the 
Eurodac regulation, and, importantly, the use of 
conditionality in relations to third countries with  
the aim to manage and reduce migration.
 These problematic provisions, taken together, show a 
strong push by member states to turn the Resettlement 
Framework into an instrument of migration 
management. Against this background, member states 
should take steps to uphold the universal right to asylum 
and meet the protection needs of vulnerable people. 
q  As such, they must demonstrate greater ambitions 
as regards the quality of protection and the number 
of	beneficiaries	under	the	Resettlement	Framework.	
Related to this is a scaling up of resettlement 
pledges and a commitment to uphold the quality of 
protection coming with refugee status.
q  In particular, humanitarian admission programmes 
should be used in a complementary fashion  
to resettlement.
q  Moreover, and when linking third countries’ 
cooperation on asylum and migration to EU 
commitments on resettlement, the EU should not 
build a sustainable relationship with third countries 
based on migration control.
q  Most crucially, the EU should not use the 
Resettlement Framework to outsource protection 
responsibilities to third countries.
 While there is a strong inclination to use the 
Resettlement Framework as an instrument of migration 
management control, the reservations listed above 
should be considered against the background of the 
traditionally humanitarian dimension of resettlement 
as a pathway to shelter for the most vulnerable.
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4 Following the migration management crisis of  
2015-16, the EU set out to reform the Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS). It intended to harmonise  
asylum standards across member states further and 
make the policy framework more robust to large-scale 
migration	flows.	One	of	the	approaches	is	resettlement:1 
the transfer of refugees from an asylum country to 
another state with the aim of permanent settlement.2 
Emerging at the EU level, the Union’s resettlement 
efforts so far have taken the form of voluntary schemes 
for which member states pledged their commitment in 
an ad hoc manner.3
 In this context, a new policy instrument appeared on 
the European agenda: the EU Resettlement Framework. 
The European Commission presented its legislative 
proposal during the summer of 2016 with the aim to 
“create a more structured, harmonised, and permanent 
framework for resettlement across the Union.”4 The 
European Parliament adopted its position in autumn 
2017 on the basis of a report by MEP Malin Björk.5 The 
Council’s mandate for bilateral negotiations followed 
shortly after.6 Negotiations on the proposal began in 
December 2017. During the Bulgarian Presidency, there 
were	five	trilogues,	the	last	of	which	took	place	in	late	
May 2018.
 For the European institutions and the member states, 
the Resettlement Framework proposal is an essential 
step towards establishing a comprehensive instrument 
for resettlement at EU level. One of the declared aims of 
the Framework is to offer a safe alternative to individuals 
in need of international protection before they resort to 
dangerous crossings via the Mediterranean at the hands 
of smuggling networks. In introducing the Resettlement 
Framework proposal, Commissioner Avramopoulos 
stated that the EU was “opening a genuine legal window 
in our efforts to close the irregular backdoor”.7 
 The legislative proposal has garnered much criticism 
from civil society organisations.8 Some of the most 
contentious issues include the mention of maximum,9 
rather than minimum numbers for resettlement 
beneficiaries.	Furthermore,	the	extent	to	which	
member states’ resettlement commitments would be 
voluntary or mandatory fuels doubts as to whether the 
Resettlement Framework can become a sustainable and 
adequate channel to asylum, especially given the large 
resettlement needs from a global perspective.10 These 
questions illustrate the tensions on the fundamental 
definition	of	resettlement	as	a	humanitarian	pathway	or	
as a migration management tool.
	 This	paper	first	introduces	the	historical	context	
of resettlement and discusses the way it has become a 
European issue. Second, it lays out the general debate 
about adding a migration management approach to this 
legislative work as opposed to preserving its traditional 
use as a humanitarian pathway. In a third section, it 
analyses to what extent the Resettlement Framework 
proposal is moving towards such an approach, looking at 
the most controversial provisions in the Commission’s 
proposal. In doing so, it focuses on the most contentious 
elements of the legislation that expose its moral 
and	intellectual	flaws,	namely	the	clauses	that	could	
lead to excluding or deterring individuals in need of 
international protection. By mapping these discussions, 
the paper aims to uncover how this overarching 
tension between the humanitarian and the migration 
management approach is emerging during negotiations 
on this piece of legislation. It concludes on the extent to 
which resettlement has moved away from its traditional 
use as a humanitarian pathway.
Introduction
1. Resettlement: towards a new direction?
 Resettlement has had its place amongst migration 
policies in one way or another since the two World 
Wars. After the founding of the International Refugee 
Organisation (IRO) in 1946, resettlement and 
repatriation11 helped high numbers of refugee groups in 
and beyond Europe to gain protection. Four years later, 
and with the IRO taken over by the newly founded United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
resettlement became a primary tool of the organisation to 
protect refugees internationally.
 Following the Vietnam War (1955-1975) and the 
resettlement of large groups of Vietnamese refugees in 
the 1970s and 1980s, states’ support for resettlement 
shifted to individual cases and became more systematic.12 
Such	commitments	were	significant	in	the	context	
of	conflicts	in	the	Middle	East	in	the	1980s,	the	first	
Gulf War (1991), the collapse of Yugoslavia (1992) and 
the	Kosovo	War	(1999).	During	these	conflicts,	states	
looked increasingly to UNHCR to identify, submit and 
resettle refugees. The UNHCR thus began developing 
specific	resettlement	criteria.13 Starting in 1995, Annual 
Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement (ATCR) began. 
These consultations became an essential platform 
for states, NGOs, and international organisations to 
cooperate on resettlement.14 They also promoted the 
tripartite structures underlying resettlement. In such 
arrangements,	UNHCR	usually	identifies	and	processes	
individuals for resettlement; states provide permanent 
sites	of	residence,	and	NGOs	assist	in	identification,	 
pre-departure, and integration post-resettlement.
 Today, resettlement needs continue to grow, most 
recently as a result of the Syrian war (since 2011). Both 
the number of countries participating in resettlement 
schemes as well as the diversity of resettlement 
programmes, including also humanitarian admission and 
private sponsorships, have increased.15 The total number 
of departures reached a high point in 2016, with close to 
130,000 individuals resettled out of a projected 1,150,000 
global resettlement needs.16 Of these, however, only a 
tenth was resettled in European countries under national 
programmes with the UK, Norway and Sweden resettling 
the highest number of individuals.17 
The new Resettlement Framework 
represents a significant departure from 
previous plans. 
125,835 
persons
GRAND TOTAL 
UNHCR RESETTLEMENT DEPARTURES 2016
UNITED STATES 78,340 
CANADA 21,838 
AUSTRALIA 7,502 
UNITED KINGDOM 5,074 
NORWAY 3,149 
SWEDEN 1,864 
FINLAND 926 
NEW ZEALAND 895 
ALL OTHERS 3,690 
FRANCE 1,328 
GERMANY 1,229 
Source: UNHCR Projected Global Resettlement Needs 2018
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 In this context, the EU administered two ad hoc 
resettlement schemes in 201518 and 2017.19 Whereas 
the 2015 scheme led to the resettlement of close to 
23,000 individuals,	the	more	recent	plan	concerns	
50,000 individuals	until	October	2019.	It	was	the	first	time	
resettlement was coordinated at EU level with member 
states contributing to the schemes through pledges on a 
voluntary basis.
 The new Resettlement Framework represents a 
significant	departure	from	previous	plans.	Running	in	
parallel to national programmes, the EU Framework is 
not an ad hoc resettlement scheme as previous ones. 
2. A lack of ambition and realism
Instead, it is an attempt to develop a more systematic and 
structured way of conducting resettlement at EU level. 
 
 As such, the Resettlement Framework has the great 
potential to offer a safe way of accessing asylum in for 
individuals in need of international protection and 
establishing a real alternative to dangerous crossings 
via the Mediterranean. In parallel, the Resettlement 
Framework proposal is consistent with the EU’s aim of 
both reducing uncontrolled migration and strengthening 
the capacity of legal pathways, thanks to which 
governments	can	monitor	both	the	profile	and	the	total	
number of individuals in need of international protection.
 Similarly, the Council sees the potential of 
resettlement as “a strategic instrument to manage 
migration	flows”20, an approach that has been strongly 
supported by a number of countries during the 
negotiations.21 In general, member states have various 
motivations for conducting resettlement: from value-
based	to	strategic	protection	considerations	in	first	
countries of asylum to foreign policy interests and 
border management goals.22 This, as well as the political 
fall-out following mandatory relocation quotas, has 
led the Council to take up as a priority the preservation 
of the voluntary nature of resettlement during the 
negotiations. Moreover, it pushed for widening the scope 
of the Resettlement Framework to include humanitarian 
admissions23 on an equal footing to resettlement, albeit 
with a more limited set of guarantees and rights than 
those coming with resettlement.
 This second section looks at how the Resettlement 
Framework	proposal	reflects	the	broader	debate	on	
migration in the European Union. By reviewing these 
most contentious points in the negotiations, it  
becomes clear how the tension between the two 
approaches pans out. This section lays out the 
fundamental issues that stand in the way of the 
Resettlement Framework in becoming a genuine 
alternative to unsafe migration channels.
2.1 NO MANDATORY TARGET
 The underlying concept of the Resettlement 
Framework shows a utilitarian approach under a 
migration management umbrella, namely through the 
initial inclusion of maximum numbers of resettlement 
spaces. Although the Resettlement Framework can 
provide a safe channel to asylum in the EU, the numerical 
ambitions of member states fall short. An inclusion of 
maximum numbers in the initial proposal seems to show 
a more defensive stance, and a reassurance towards 
member states that they will not be facing unpredictable 
 The Parliament accepted this inclusion but set explicit 
quotas for resettlement and humanitarian admission. 
During the negotiations, it consistently argued for 
resettlement as a durable solution for refugees and 
underlined that the “strategic use of resettlement should 
not be interpreted as migration control or used as a 
means to achieve the Union’s foreign policy objectives”.24 
This stands in direct contrast to the Council’s position 
which explicitly highlights the strategic and geopolitical 
objectives of migration management to which 
resettlement could contribute. 
 Civil society organisations voiced similar concerns 
about the Resettlement Framework proposal. In their 
view, the EU was undertaking more efforts to create a 
system that controlled and reduced migration to the bloc, 
rather than building sustainable and accessible pathways 
to asylum in the Union.25 Taking a critical stance towards 
the Framework, they stated that ”resettlement must be 
regarded as complementary to, and not a replacement 
of, spontaneous arrivals and the right to seek asylum in 
Europe”.26 This also corresponds to NGOs’ perception of 
resettlement as a pathway that should not preclude other 
channels of migration, be they regular or irregular.27 This 
position sees resettlement as a safe option that should 
neither discourage nor prevent the movement of refugees 
and migrants when initiated by themselves. Within this 
debate, NGOs and UNHCR aim to preserve resettlement’s 
traditional use as a humanitarian pathway and protection 
tool for the most vulnerable, complementary to other 
ways of migration. 
commitments. Initially, the European Parliament fought 
for including a minimum instead of a maximum number. 
It aimed to raise the total number of resettlements to 
20% of UNHCR’s projected global resettlement needs 
(equalling 240,000 out of 1.2 million individuals as 
identified	for	2018).28 Following protracted negotiations 
with the Council, the Parliament gave in on its objective 
of setting a compulsory quantitative target.29 It then 
pursued the inclusion of non-binding ‘targets’ with 
the aim that more member states would be ready to 
commit to resettlement as a genuine alternative to more 
dangerous routes to the EU. 
The Resettlement Framework should be 
expanded boldly in numbers to offer a valid 
alternative to unsafe migration pathways. 
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3. Discretionary selection of asylum seekers
 This third section examines the elements of the 
proposed legislation that grant member states a 
higher degree of control in selecting candidates for 
resettlement. On that basis, member states would be in 
a position to deprioritise and potentially exclude other 
candidates from accessing protection via resettlement.
3.1  ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA AND FAMILY 
REUNIFICATION (ART. 5)
 In the proposal, the eligibility criteria for resettlement 
candidates is not limited to those individuals that fall 
under	the	definition	of	a	refugee	according	to	the	1951	
Convention.32 Nor it is limited to the UNHCR resettlement 
submission criteria, which concerns particularly vulnerable 
persons and takes into account factors such as legal and 
physical protection and medical needs. They consider in 
particular survivors of violence and torture, women at risk, 
children and elderly refugees, and also those that do not 
have local integration prospects or resettlement with the 
aim	of	family	reunification.33 It also includes the “family 
members of third-country nationals or stateless persons or 
Union citizens legally residing in a Member State”.
 While the Parliament stated during the negotiations 
that	family	reunification	should	be	independent	of	
resettlement	targets,	the	institutions	finally	agreed	
that close family members should form a category of 
individuals “to be resettled with the aim of ensuring 
family unity”. While promising to keep families 
together, it is also problematic in that there is no 
clarity concerning a potential overlap between the legal 
schemes	of	resettlement	and	family	reunification.	For	
example, both pieces of legislation target the spouse 
or partner of the applicant and their minor unmarried 
children.	The	family	reunification	directive	already	
covers these cases. Their mention in the Resettlement 
Framework proposal would enable member states to 
select candidates for resettlement that would have had 
a	right	to	come	to	the	EU	under	the	family	reunification	
directive anyway.34 The resettlement spaces allocated 
to	family	reunification	would	be	taken	away	from	
individuals that do not have family links in the EU, 
which would limit the overall number of people eligible 
for resettlement.35
 By placing different migration pathways under the 
umbrella of refugee resettlement, the Resettlement 
Framework proposal reveals its migration management 
approach. It gives a higher degree of control to 
member states during the resettlement process and 
could potentially lead to giving priority to the ‘safer’ 
candidates with family ties. As such, the Resettlement 
Although the quotas are not mandatory, 
member states should still raise them 
and thus demonstrate their bold 
commitment to resettlement. 
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 Taking into account the size of global resettlement 
needs, however, the Resettlement Framework should be 
expanded boldly in numbers to offer a valid alternative 
to unsafe migration pathways. Resettling 20% of global 
needs to EU member states as proposed by the Parliament 
may not be politically feasible. The number of individuals 
currently resettled to EU member states needs, however, 
to	come	considerably	closer	to	the	flows	of	refugees	
reaching the EU through dangerous migration channels 
if the EU wants to establish resettlement as a realistic 
alternative to such perilous routes.
2.2 A VOLUNTARY COMMITMENT
 The question of whether member states would 
be bound to contribute to resettlement schemes or 
whether this would happen on a voluntary basis was also 
discussed intensely during negotiations. The latter being 
the Council’s top priority, it shows that member states 
feel more comfortable with agreeing to resettlement 
as	a	controllable,	and	numerically	confined,	migration	
management tool, rather than a somewhat incalculable 
humanitarian commitment. The issue of mandatory 
quotas as a way of building solidarity in the context 
of	relocation	was	a	significant	point	of	disagreement	
between member states.30 Some national governments 
refused altogether to take in relocated asylum seekers as 
they cited a substantial burden for their administrations 
and economies as well as staunch opposition from their 
populations. Against this background, it was highly 
unlikely that the Council would have agreed to binding 
quotas for resettling refugees from outside Europe. 
Following intense negotiations, the Parliament sought a 
consensus with the Council by agreeing to voluntary,  
non-binding quotas.31
 
 Only then is it possible to evaluate whether the 
compromise between the institutions will translate into 
effective practice. To make resettlement a real alternative 
to unsafe migration pathways, member states should 
take into account UNHCR’s numerical proposals on 
resettlement and follow up on these, irrespective of the 
voluntary nature of resettlement quotas.
8Framework would give member states more 
discretionary power. In the end, it may discriminate 
against the vulnerable people that do not fall under 
any of the ‘family’ categories. Given the likelihood of 
a limited numerical commitment by member states, 
this would lead to a smaller number of ‘exclusive’ 
resettlement places that would hardly be accessible to 
vulnerable individuals.
3.2  ORDINARY AND EXPEDITED 
PROCEDURES (ART. 10 AND 11)
 An essential scheme in the Resettlement Framework 
is the humanitarian admission programme, which was 
not included in the Commission’s initial proposal, as it 
provides for a different protection status and distinct 
procedures. The Council introduced this scheme on an 
equal footing with resettlement, which is problematic 
for	similar	reasons	as	for	the	family	reunification	
cases (see above). It could lead to lower standards of 
protection and fewer places for resettlement candidates. 
The scheme would apply especially for those individuals 
that would be brought to member states via this 
programme and granted only temporary protection. 
The European Parliament initially strongly rejected the 
Council’s introduction of humanitarian admissions on 
an equal footing with resettlement on the basis that 
this could water down protection standards. But the 
inclusion of such a clause constituted a hard red line 
for several member states  and the Council even pushed 
for renaming the piece of legislation “Resettlement and 
Humanitarian Admission Framework”. 
 During the trilogues, the Parliament imposed quotas 
on	the	number	of	beneficiaries	for	each	pathway	to	
preserve the primary focus on resettlement in the 
Framework. It initially aimed to have 70% of spaces 
earmarked for resettlement, 20% for humanitarian 
admissions and 10% for emergency cases. However, 
negotiations with the Council resulted in a compromise 
on an approximate goal of 60% for resettlement 
admissions without setting a clear objective for the 
number of refugees to be resettled or a quota for 
emergency admissions.37
humanitarian admission as a complementary option in 
the Resettlement Framework would have been welcome. 
Member states should not, however, systematically 
resort to humanitarian admission programmes to 
grant only temporary protection to individuals that 
should receive refugee status. The use of quotas to 
preserve a certain percentage of cases for resettlement 
is, therefore, a welcome concession by the Council. 
Nonetheless, it needs to be followed up by concrete and 
substantial numerical commitments to resettlement on 
the part of member states.
3.3  INTEGRATION POTENTIAL  
(ART. 6 AND 10) 
 Concerning the admission procedures, the 
Resettlement Framework proposal includes a 
paragraph (Art. 10, 1(a) on the Ordinary Procedure 
for resettlement) that allows member states to give 
preference to third-country nationals with “social or 
cultural links, or other characteristics that can facilitate 
integration”. As such, the integration potential can 
simultaneously serve as a rewarding criterion enabling 
resettlement or as a punitive ground for exclusion from 
resettlement. In the end, member states would thus have 
the possibility to select candidates on the basis of their 
perceived potential for integration, a development that 
once again attests to a migration management approach 
in this part of the legislation.
 The ‘integration potential’ criterion to admit 
or refuse candidates for resettlement has been a 
very contentious issue during the negotiations. The 
Council was in favour of including a lack of integration 
prospects, such as a refusal to participate in  
pre-departure orientation, as a reason for ineligibility  
for resettlement in Article 6. The Parliament has 
vigorously opposed this, stressing the universality of the 
right to asylum and arguing that protection should not 
be made conditional on one’s integration potential.
 Concerns about taking into account integration 
potential	have	been	flagged	before	in	proposals	for	
business-led resettlement schemes38, while it has 
been a more or less formal selection criterion in 
some member states. In these cases, however, certain 
groups are frequently exempted from the integration 
potential criterion based on their protection needs 
and vulnerability and the rule is not necessarily used 
as a reason for exclusion from resettlement.39 With 
this clause in the Resettlement Framework, it would 
be	the	first	time	that	the	EU	would	be	in	a	position	to	
condition the access to protection (in this case through 
resettlement) on integration potential. Including this as 
a criterion could give preference to certain individuals 
over some of the most vulnerable in resettlement 
processing,	especially	since	it	is	not	clearly	defined	
in the Commission proposal how this would relate 
to vulnerability and other eligibility criteria. In the 
end, the integration potential criterion could lead to 
discriminatory practices in selecting candidates for 
resettlement and potentially undermine member states’ 
need to resettle those that are the most vulnerable.
By placing different migration 
pathways under the umbrella of 
refugee resettlement, the Resettlement 
Framework proposal reveals its migration 
management approach.
 The inclusion of humanitarian admission 
programmes	could	enable	the	EU	to	be	more	flexible	
in responding to fast-changing situations where 
resettlement processing might not be quick or 
robust enough. Similarly, adding the possibility of 
The proposal portrays resettlement  
as an alternative, exclusive form 
of migration. It is designed as an 
instrument to discourage  
spontaneous migrant arrivals. 
4.  Deterrence against resettlement
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 The Resettlement Framework proposal includes 
provisions that bear the possibility to go further than 
excluding individuals from accessing protection via 
resettlement.	Some	clauses	seem	fit	to	discourage	
spontaneous	arrivals	in	the	first	place,	on	the	one	hand,	
and deter individuals from altogether seeking protection 
through resettlement, on the other.
4.1  GROUNDS FOR INELIGIBILITY (ART. 6)
 Article 6 of the proposed legislation, grounds for 
ineligibility	(formerly	known	as	exclusion),	specifies	
that “persons who have irregularly stayed, irregularly 
entered, or attempted to irregularly enter the territory 
of	the	Member	States	during	the	five	years	prior	to	
resettlement” shall be excluded from targeted Union 
resettlement schemes. As such, the text does not allow 
for resettlement to be used in a complimentary way, as it 
excludes migrants and refugees from resettlement that 
self-initiated their migrations in an irregular fashion. 
 This provision shows how the proposal portrays 
resettlement as an alternative, exclusive form of 
migration. It is designed as an instrument to discourage 
spontaneous migrant arrivals. During the trilogues, 
the Parliament was particularly critical towards such 
punitive ineligibility grounds. As a result, the term 
“exclusion” has been replaced by “ineligibility” to avoid 
any misinterpretation whereby it could have implied 
exclusion from asylum, rather than resettlement. 
 These punitive criteria for resettling refugees 
continue,	however,	to	reflect	member	states’	aim	of	
being more selective in their resettlement programmes. 
At the same time, this would provide for a tool that 
discourages spontaneous, and in their view, uncontrolled 
arrivals through such strong deterrence elements. In 
short, these ineligibility grounds create an instrument 
of greater migration management control to member 
states rather than preserve the humanitarian character 
of resettlement. 
4.2  THE LINK TO EURODAC (ART. 10)
 The Council also proposed the inclusion of a 
reference to the Eurodac Regulation, the recast of which 
is currently in trilogues as well.  Since its introduction 
in	2003,	Eurodac	established	an	EU	asylum	fingerprint	
database	to	record	where	the	asylum	seeker	first	
entered the EU territory and hence identify the member 
state responsible for the asylum application. During 
the trilogues on the Resettlement Framework, the 
Parliament and the Council disagreed on the duration 
during which a candidate’s data could be stored (both 
for negative and positive decisions on admission for 
resettlement). They also held divergent views on 
where and when during the resettlement process the 
registration	of	fingerprints	would	take	place.	
Linking Eurodac to resettlement would further 
strengthen the EU’s control of who gets asylum through 
resettlement. It also adds a security angle to the 
Resettlement Framework, since member states would be 
able to share such private data among each other more 
easily and potentially commit grave breaches of data 
and privacy. Moreover, it would allow member states to 
have the possibility to reject resettlement candidates on 
the grounds of attempting to enter the EU irregularly, as 
recorded in Eurodac.
4.3  COUNTRIES FROM WHICH 
RESETTLEMENT IS TO OCCUR (ART. 4)
 The Resettlement Framework proposal also mirrors 
the EU’s increasing reliance on partnerships with third 
countries to manage migration. In the 2016 Partnership 
Framework communication, resettlement was 
mentioned as a way for the EU “to discourage irregular 
and dangerous journeys”.  Resettlement was also an 
important part of the EU-Turkey Statement, stipulating 
that for every asylum seeker returned to Turkey from the 
Greek islands, a European member state would resettle 
a	Syrian	refugee.	However,	rather	than	fulfilling	their	
pledges, member states created a deterrence mechanism 
against migrants and asylum seekers in transit in 
Turkey.42 More recently, in the joint communication on 
Libya entitled ‘Migration on the Central Mediterranean 
Route:	Managing	flows,	saving	lives’	(January	2017),	
the Commission raised the possibility of including 
resettlement in the EU’s overall approach to managing 
migration on this route.43 Now, the Resettlement 
Framework proposal signals the next step in the  
EU’s efforts to more closely involve third countries  
in migration management, albeit in a very  
controversial way.
Conditionality clause
 In doing so, the Commission has introduced 
a conditionality clause, which has hampered the 
negotiations on the legislative proposal. It has spelt 
out a way for the EU to use resettlement as leverage in 
Linking resettlement with a third 
country’s management of the 
EU’s external border furthers the 
externalisation of the EU’s migration 
management.
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political dialogues with third countries. NGOs in the 
field	have	widely	criticised	making	the	EU’s	commitment	
to resettlement hinge on the cooperation of third 
countries.44 Their criticism echoes the central issue of 
preserving resettlement as a humanitarian tool and 
durable solution for refugees, rather than employing 
it for migration deterrence. During negotiations, 
the European Parliament strongly opposed this 
conditionality clause and argued that the proposal had 
to	reflect	the	humanitarian	character	of	resettlement.	
Disagreement with the Council on this issue became 
one if not the main stumbling block of the trilogues. For 
the Council, this article is of great importance in using 
the Resettlement Framework as "part of a well-managed 
migration policy".45
	 More	specifically,	Article	4	on	“Regions	or	third	
countries	from	which	resettlement	is	to	occur”,	specifies	
that third countries’ overall relations with the Union in 
the area of migration and asylum will be an important 
factor on which the Commission will base its choices 
of regions or third countries from which resettlement 
should take place. The institutions agreed during 
the trilogues that the selection would also take into 
account UNHCR projected global resettlement needs46, 
as was traditionally the case in national resettlement 
programmes. They also agreed that member states 
would still rely on UNHCR for referral of candidates. 
Nevertheless, the inclusion of a conditionality clause 
concerning functioning partnerships with countries in 
the region is new for resettlement.
Effective cooperation
	 The	legislative	proposal	specifies	that	resettlement	
should also hinge on a third country’s effective 
cooperation with the Union in the area of migration 
and asylum. The latter would be measured against a 
country’s efforts to reduce the number of third-country 
nationals crossing the EU’s border from its territory. 
Moreover, each government would have to create the 
conditions under which asylum applicants can be 
returned. This approach would build on the expansive 
use	of	the	first	country	of	asylum	and	safe	third	country	
concepts. The proposal also calls on third countries to 
develop an effective asylum system to increase their 
capacity to receive and protect individuals staying in 
their territories. Another sign of effective cooperation 
would be an increase in the rate of return (including 
through readmission agreements). 
 Resettlement has a logical use in alleviating pressure 
on	countries	that	experience	difficulty	in	hosting	
refugees. Making resettlement conditional  
on a third country’s cooperation on migration and 
asylum would, however, be both paradoxical and 
unhelpful for countries unable to cope.47 Article 4, in 
particular, can be interpreted as an instrument for 
member	states	to	exert	influence	on	third	countries,	
even more so when linking cooperation in resettlement 
to EU assistance in other areas. That is why conditioning 
development aid on the reduction of migration to the 
EU, in particular by means of readmission agreements 
or migration compacts, as done in the context of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy,49 has been widely 
criticised by civil society organisations.50
Dependence on third countries?
 The Resettlement Framework seems to include 
similar objectives, in particular when looking at how  
the geographical priorities for the resettlement  
schemes are dependent on compliance with the  
criteria listed in the legislative text. On the one 
hand, this takes the proposal further away from the 
humanitarian objectives of resettlement; on the  
other, this also puts the EU and the Resettlement 
Framework in a position of being dependent on the 
cooperation of third countries in managing irregular 
migration movements.
 In this regard, it is also unclear to what extent  
third countries would be incentivised to reform their 
asylum systems and border management solely on 
the grounds of EU commitments to resettlement. As 
of now, there is no clarity concerning the form that 
other incentives might take. It is however likely that 
the EU will link the Resettlement Framework with 
other initiatives under the EU’s Partnership Framework 
on Migration with third countries. In that case, these 
initiatives and the Union’s incentives would have to 
be	tailored	to	the	third	country’s	specific	situation,	
something the Resettlement Framework does not 
foresee for the moment.
How safe for how long?
 In this context, the Resettlement Framework 
proposal also draws on controversial considerations, 
such	as	the	‘first’	country	of	asylum	or	a	‘safe’	third	
country,	when	defining	the	conditions	for	the	return	
of asylum seekers to third countries. For example, 
civil society organisations have heavily criticised 
how the ‘safety’ condition51 is rendering resettlement 
dependent on cooperation with countries that have 
allegedly established safe conditions. This approach is 
problematic52, in particular with respect to how the EU 
would deal with a deterioration of conditions for  
asylum seekers in such ‘safe’ countries. Countries  
that are hosting a large number of refugees may 
experience a shift in public opinion against the  
refugee population, as has happened for instance  
in Lebanon.53
Resettlement conditional on cooperation 
from third countries could eventually 
reinforce the harmful and dangerous 
contexts in which individuals are trying 
to access protection today. 
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 The strategic use of the safe third country concept 
has the potential to both worsen the conditions for 
refugees and decrease the host society’s support for 
cooperation with the EU on migration management. 
Establishing the Resettlement Framework with the aim 
of moving away from ad hoc measures and uncontrolled 
migration movements does not square with being 
dependent on changing conditions in third countries for 
the operationalisation of resettlement schemes.
Outsourcing migration management
 Two intermediate conclusions can be drawn from 
this particular article. First, member states are pursuing 
a migration management approach through conditional 
cooperation with third countries on resettlement. 
Second, this quid pro quo approach of linking 
resettlement with a third country’s management of the 
EU’s external border furthers the externalisation of the 
EU’s migration management.54 This shift is problematic 
because it can have an impact on where refugees will 
be able to access asylum.55 Where border controls bar 
refugees from accessing asylum in a regular way, they 
usually create more perilous channels through which 
vulnerable individuals will seek protection. Making 
resettlement conditional on cooperation from third 
countries could eventually reinforce the harmful and 
dangerous contexts in which individuals are trying to 
access protection today. One can wonder to what extent 
the Resettlement Framework will contribute to the 
Council’s goal of a “well-managed” migration policy. 
In fact, the dilemma remains. Will the Resettlement 
Framework offer a safe alternative for persons in need 
of international protection or push more individuals to 
resort to perilous ways to access asylum?
5. Recommendations
 The Resettlement Framework is the EU’s attempt 
to approach resettlement in a systemic, structural and 
sustainable way. It holds the potential to shape the future 
of resettlement at EU level. If administered boldly, it is an 
opportunity for the EU to offer a safe way for individuals 
in need of international protection to access asylum in 
the member states.
 The intense discussion on the Resettlement 
Framework proposal in the trilogues has made tensions 
between two different approaches to resettlement 
apparent. On the one hand, there is the aim to conserve 
the humanitarian nature of resettlement as a pathway  
for the most vulnerable to access protection. On the  
other, resettlement as a new migration management  
tool in a more control-oriented CEAS also appeals to  
member states.
 The attention that resettlement now receives for its 
potential as a migration management tool could lead  
to	a	significant	shift	from	its	traditional	use	as	a	
humanitarian pathway. This evolution is problematic  
for several reasons: 
q  First, it does not correspond to the nature of forced 
displacement, which is often hard to anticipate. 
The aim of precluding the possibility of spontaneous 
movements and arrivals, therefore, does not match 
with the often-volatile contexts in which persons in 
need of international protection are forced to move. 
q  Second, it shifts the geographical focus, sometimes 
quite literally to a selected few regions. Focusing 
exclusively on areas that seem most “affected” by 
uncontrolled migration to the EU may leave blind 
spots on the map. At the same time, this runs the 
danger of neglecting countries that might not be in a 
position	to	benefit	from	institutionalised	resettlement	
but still have particularly vulnerable refugees. 
q  Third, it creates discriminations among individuals 
in need of international protection. During the 
negotiations between the Parliament and the Council, 
the UNHCR resettlement criteria have been added to 
the Resettlement Framework proposal. However, there 
is still a high risk of impeding access to asylum for 
those that may not meet these resettlement criteria, 
nor are in a position to receive protection via other 
channels. For instance, some individuals may not be 
eligible for resettlement on the grounds of particular 
vulnerability	nor	with	the	aim	of	family	reunification.	
At the same time, they may be persecuted in their 
countries of origin, and have the right to protection 
as refugees. Through the exclusionary and deterring 
elements of the Resettlement Framework, it would be 
complicated for these individuals to gain asylum in 
any way.
 Notwithstanding these three underlying problematics 
of a migration management approach, a basic puzzle of 
the proposed Resettlement Framework still needs to be 
Member states must significantly 
scale up resettlement pledges  
under the Framework.
The EU should not outsource   
its responsibility to protect  
to third countries. 
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addressed: if member states intend to elevate the status 
and importance of resettlement at EU level, they must 
demonstrate more ambition as regards the quality 
of protection and the number of individuals that can 
benefit	from	it.		
q  First, regarding numbers, member states must 
significantly scale up resettlement pledges under 
the Framework. It is highly unlikely that people 
would stop taking recourse to dangerous routes 
to access asylum in the EU if member states are 
unwilling to agree to bolder commitments than 
those currently negotiated. Although voluntary 
resettlement commitments have increased 
with the 2017 resettlement scheme, much 
larger commitments are needed given UNHCR’s 
assessments. However, mandatory quotas of higher 
numbers are politically unfeasible and have already 
been ruled out during the trilogues. As of now, there 
does not seem to be a solution to this particular 
numerical dilemma.
q  Second, and in addition to scaling up resettlement 
numbers, the EU should also commit to upholding 
the quality of protection coming with refugee 
status. There is no harm in adding humanitarian 
admission programmes on top of other pathways 
such	as	family	reunification	to	the	Resettlement	
Framework, but only as long as it does not impact the 
protection status of refugees. 
 In the Framework, humanitarian admission 
programmes should be administered in a 
complementary fashion to resettlement. They 
should not count towards the same quotas to avoid the 
exclusion of especially vulnerable individuals in need of 
international protection.
 When it comes to linking third countries’ 
cooperation on asylum and migration to EU 
commitments to resettlement, several issues arise.
q  First, the EU should not build a sustainable 
relationship with third countries based on their 
cooperation on control or even prevention of 
onwards migration to Europe. Such a prospect is 
problematic because it creates a context in which 
processing asylum applications could be outsourced 
geographically to third countries. The decision of 
whether an individual is selected for resettlement 
or denied access to asylum through this regular 
pathway would be taken outside of the EU. As 
such, the deterrence objective features strongly 
in the Resettlement Framework proposal: if an 
individual decides to migrate and subsequently 
enters or stays irregularly in a member state, he or 
she would be barred from any form of resettlement 
or humanitarian admission (Art. 6). Similarly, 
the outsourcing of asylum and reception to 
third countries, as well as increasing returns and 
readmission of failed asylum seekers (Art. 4), is also 
intended to result in a reduction of self-initiated 
border crossings.  
q  Second, the EU should not outsource its 
responsibility to protect to third countries that 
very often have lesser economic means or political 
context to offer a durable solution for refugees in 
their territories. Resettling a limited number of 
individuals will not make much of a difference in 
improving the situation on the ground for third 
countries. It is therefore doubtful that third countries 
would see an added value in investing in migration 
management for the EU with little return for them, 
apart from comparatively few resettlement transfers 
out of their territories. Moreover, it would be even 
more problematic if the EU would, in an attempt to 
make cooperation more attractive to third countries, 
link development aid and EU commitments to 
resettlement to third countries’ cooperation in 
preventing onward movements.56 
 In short, the Resettlement Framework proposal 
is part of an ongoing shift from a value-based to 
an interest-based approach to managing migration 
and providing asylum. This proposed legislation 
illustrates the conceptual evolution of member states 
on resettlement: from being primarily a humanitarian 
pathway to taking on a migration management 
approach. It remains to be seen to what extent the EU 
will be able to develop the Resettlement Framework 
in a manner that upholds its fundamental value as a 
humanitarian instrument that offers protection to the 
most vulnerable.
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